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(ix) As soon as hostilities broke out we would have to provide for the security of the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and Basra. Three brigades, some anti-aircraft artillery, and fighter aircraft would be necessary for this. Of these, only the three brigades could definitely be made available early in 1940 (paragraph 18).

(x) The Russians might overrun the northern fringe of Iran, perhaps as far as Tabriz. In addition the whole of Iran might be thrown into a state of chaos by air bombardment. This would no doubt have repercussions in Iraq where also considerable disorder might result from air bombardment. To deal with this situation and to maintain our communications through Iraq much larger forces would be necessary. So far as can be foreseen these larger land forces would be available in the Middle East and India late in 1940, although their employment would depend upon the progress made in the provision of maintenance requirements. The provision of adequate air forces and anti-aircraft units would, however, be a matter of great difficulty (paragraphs 16-19).

India and Afghanistan.

(xi) Soviet land and air action in this area is to be expected as soon as war

breaks out (paragraph 20).

(xii) With the land forces normally located in the Central Asian Military district, Russia could rapidly occupy the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan. A further land advance on India could be under- taken by Russia only as a long-term project, if at all (paragraph 21). (xiii) With the air forces now located in the Central Military district, Russia could bombard objectives in any part of Afghanistan and some military centres in the North-West Frontier of India. By reinforcing the above air force with a few long-range bombers, Russia could attack Indian cities as far as Lahore and Quetta (paragraph 22).

(xiv) These attacks, if successful, would create grave disorders amongst the tribes of Afghanistan and the North-West Provinces of India; might cause considerable damage in the crowded cities of the North-West of India; and would certainly result in acute internal security problems (paragraph 23).

(xv) Afghanistan would undoubtedly call for assistance on land and in the There would be no possibility of providing air assistance; but the Indian Government might be able to assist Afghanistan by despatching a small mobile force towards Ghazni via Kandahar. Our inability to give effective aid to Afghanistan would have unfortunate but unavoidable repercussions on our relations with the Afghan Government and on our prestige in the Moslem world, to offset which it would be important to strike against Russian vulnerable points elsewhere at the earliest possible moment (paragraphs 24-26).

(xvi) The demand by India for reinforcement by fighter aircraft, and by anti-aircraft artillery would be difficult to resist. Even if the Italian attitude justified their release, the fighter squadrons in the Middle East are already earmarked for the defence of Turkey and Iraq. Substantial reinforcement from the fighter or anti-aircraft resources of Great Britain and France would clearly be undesirable: (paragraph 27).

(xvii) India might cease to be a potential source of supply of reinforcements for other theatres of war, but she should be able to maintain her position unaided except in respect of anti-aircraft defences (paragraph 28).

Far East.

(xviii) A limited submarine threat must be anticipated against trade which, however, is not vital; Japan might adopt a more forward policy in the Far East to the detriment of Allied interests (paragraphs 29-30).

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