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(xxx) If we could obtain access to the Black Sea, naval action against the Russian sea communications could interrupt the distribution of a considerable proportion of the oil from Batum and thereby add to the congestion in the Baku area and on the railways. Carrier-borne air attack would not be practicable (paragraphs 50--51).

(xxxi) If the Turks were at

at war with Russia, they might undertake operations on land against Batum, possibly in conjunction with a rising of the Armenian and Georgian tribes (paragraph 52).

(xxxii) Apart from operations in the Black Sea, naval action in this area would be confined to contraband control over Russian sea-borne trade through the Ægean (paragraphs 37–38).

Far East.

(xxxiii) Action would be limited to submarine patrols and to cutting off supplies through Vladivostok as effectively as possible (para- graph 53).

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Broad Conclusions.

55. The broad conclusions to be drawn from the above appreciation are as follows:

(i) We have previously recommended* that the risk of going to war with Russia would be acceptable only if it led to a result which might cause the early defeat of Germany. Capture of the Galivare orefields would be a case in point.

(1) As a result of our present examination we consider that there is no action which we could take against Russia which would bring about the early defeat of Germany.

(iii) Our examination has, however, indicated

indicated that, assuming the co-operation of Turkey, successful attack on the Caucasian oilfields might in time result in the economic and the military collapse of Russia, which in turn would deprive Germany of any hope of supplies from that source.

(iv) At sea, war with Russia would result in material increase in the naval strength of our enemies, particularly in submarine forces. The increased threat to Allied sea communications and the necessity for some redistribution of our naval force would add to our difficulties, but it should be within the Allied naval capacity to overcome them. (v) On land and in the air, we should be exposed in war with Russia to serious threats in India, Iraq and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, with inadequate means of meeting them. During 1940 we cannot be sure that our military strength will be sufficient to meet even the contingencies which may arise in war with Germany alone. Moreover, in all operations which may be considered. account has to be taken of the attitude of Italy. Consequently :

(a) Land forces on an adequate scale to counter Russian threats in the Middle East cannot be found until late in 1940, except at the expense of the British Expeditionary Force in France or by accepting risks vis-à-vis Italy.

(b) Anti-aircraft units which would be necessary for the defence of the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and which would be demanded by India cannot be provided during 1940 except at the expense of Home Defence.

(c) Fighter aircraft for the defence of India and Abadan would not be available unless the attitude of Italy justified their with- drawal from Egypt and they had not been committed to the defence of Turkey or Northern Iraq.

On the other hand it must be remembered that Russia has to maintain forces widespread through the length and breadth of the vast territories of the U.S.S.R.

* Paper No. C.O.S. (40) 181.

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