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our commitments in European waters had released adequate naval forces. Our naval action in this area would be mainly directed to exercising contraband control for the purpose of cutting off seaborne supplies to Eastern Siberia, and thus adding a further strain to the already over-burdened transportation system. This would also prevent goods reaching Germany via Vladivostok and the Trans- Siberian railway. Lack of suitably placed bases would render the effective exercise of this control difficult.

A

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

54. We summarise our appreciation in the following terms :-

General Factors.

(i) German policy is directed at securing the maximum economic assistance from Russia that the latter will permit. If we became involved in war with Russia we should be indirectly striking at Germany by ensuring that the extent of this assistance is not increased (paragraph 2).

(ii) On the other hand, the extent of this assistance is at present limited by the weakness of the Russian transportation and industrial systems, and is likely to be on a small scale in 1940 (paragraph 6). (iii) Russia is unlikely to risk open hostilities with a major Power. But if we force them upon her she could undertake limited operations in more than one area. and it would be to the interest both of Germany and of Russia to impose dispersion of effort upon the Allies. Germany might give Russia active assistance in this respect. (paragraphs 4, 5 and 7).

(iv) The greatest weakness in the Russian economic system is her dependence upon the oil supplies derived from the Caucasus. We are advised that the interruption of these supplies would in time paralyse the Russian military machine and disorganise Russian national life (paragraph 6).

General.

Methods by which Russia could Strike at Allied Interests.

(v) One of the greatest dangers would be Russian subversive propaganda.

This calls for active counter-measures (paragraph 10).

Northern Europe.

(vi) The Russian threat in this area would be purely maritime and could be met, but the loss of our supplies of Swedish iron ore, should the Russians reach the Atlantic seaboard, would be serious (paragraph 11).

Near and Middle East.

(vii) Russian submarines might attempt the passage of the Straits to attack our communications in the Mediterranean. Counter-measures would be much facilitated by Turkish co-operation, without which the threat might possibly become serious (paragraph 13).

(viii) It would be contrary to Russian interests to initiate action which would disturb the neutrality of Turkey or Iran. But if war broke out between Great Britain and Russia, and Turkey or Iran became involved, Russia might undertake limited land operations in northern Iran and air operations against objectives in Iraq and Iran. The spread of the war to the Balkans is more likely to be brought about by a conflict of German and Russian interests than by a Russian attempt to strike at the Allies, and has therefore not been considered in this paper (paragraphs 12 and 15).

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