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14.

"It is not of course suggested that the Allies could operate substantial forces in both areas (ie, the Balkans and Scandinavia) simultaneously; but neither is it considered that Germany could take the offensive in both places at the same time".

137

The French representatives were quite definitely of

opinion, that, in view of Germany's present advantages on

land and in the air and of the relative weakness of Swedish

resistance, Germany might quite well capture a number of

bases at any rate in Southern Scandinavia and at the same

time conduct a major operation in the Balkans,

15.

Our own view is that by the Spring of 1940, Germany,

while remaining on the defensive in the West, should have

sufficient forces to overrun Sweden and to occupy Rumania and

Hungary, even if these countries decided to resist.

If,

therefore, Germany feels that either her iron cre or oil

supplies are threatened we cannot rule out the possibility

that she might undertake both operations simultaneously.

16.

In the event of an invasion of Rumania by Germany,

we are almost certain to receive urgent calls for assistance

from Turkey. On the other hand, Germany could not at the

same time undertake an offensive in the west and it should

therefore be possible for us to divert some forces from the

Western front to the assistance of Turkey. Unfortunately,

not only would such diversion by sea be a very slow process

but the forces which would be most urgently required would be

those very units (i.e. fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft

artillery) which we could least afford to release from the

Western front. It must be remembered that Germany's

preponderence in air forces and their strategical mobility on

interior lines would enable them to present a constant threat

to Great Britain and France, even while Germany was

conducting operations in Scandinavia and the Balkans,

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