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14.
"It is not of course suggested that the Allies could operate substantial forces in both areas (ie, the Balkans and Scandinavia) simultaneously; but neither is it considered that Germany could take the offensive in both places at the same time".
137
The French representatives were quite definitely of
opinion, that, in view of Germany's present advantages on
land and in the air and of the relative weakness of Swedish
resistance, Germany might quite well capture a number of
bases at any rate in Southern Scandinavia and at the same
time conduct a major operation in the Balkans,
15.
Our own view is that by the Spring of 1940, Germany,
while remaining on the defensive in the West, should have
sufficient forces to overrun Sweden and to occupy Rumania and
Hungary, even if these countries decided to resist.
If,
therefore, Germany feels that either her iron cre or oil
supplies are threatened we cannot rule out the possibility
that she might undertake both operations simultaneously.
16.
In the event of an invasion of Rumania by Germany,
we are almost certain to receive urgent calls for assistance
from Turkey. On the other hand, Germany could not at the
same time undertake an offensive in the west and it should
therefore be possible for us to divert some forces from the
Western front to the assistance of Turkey. Unfortunately,
not only would such diversion by sea be a very slow process
but the forces which would be most urgently required would be
those very units (i.e. fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft
artillery) which we could least afford to release from the
Western front. It must be remembered that Germany's
preponderence in air forces and their strategical mobility on
interior lines would enable them to present a constant threat
to Great Britain and France, even while Germany was
conducting operations in Scandinavia and the Balkans,
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