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(a)

(e)

The occupation of certain Portuguese or Spanish Islands.

The capture of Iceland.

(f)

The occupation of portions of Eire.

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25.

Of the above, 24(a), the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula and the Tarifa area offer the best prospects of assisting in the attainment of the object. Rail and road communications in Spain are poor and in bad condition. The possibility of sabotage on the lines of communication must be reckoned with even if organised resistance is not encountered. As has already been pointed out (para, 11) the economic problem for Germany would be most serious. The difficulties are great, but not, of necessity, insuperable.

26. The occupation of the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula and the Tarifa area offer such important results that Germany must be considering the operation, but this advantage might be offset, to some extent, by British occupation of some of the Atlantic islands,

27. In rogard to 24(b) above, the occupation of the Ceuta Peninsula of Spanish Morocco and the Tangier Zone; this operation might follow upon the occupation of Spain and Portugal and would be of great importance in obstructing the navigation of the Straits of Gibraltar by British shipping. It is unlikely to be undertaken without the occupation of lines of communication through Spain ar without the co-operation, active or passive, of Spain itself.

28.

In regard to 24(c) above, the establishment of a submarine base at Dakar; while this would be of great advantage to Germany in extending her distant blockade measures it could only be achieved with the co-operation of the French African Empire. Germany cannot forcibly occupy Dakar from land or sea and at present French co-operation is improbable.

29. In regard to 24(a) above, the occupation of certain Portuguese or Spanish Atlantic Islands: the object would be

to prevent their occupation by Britain and to provide refuelling bases for, vessels engaged in distant blockade. A seaborne expedition and regular supply would be necessary in each case. The operation is improbable as an isolated one,

In regard to 24(e), the capture of Iceland;

Britain

30. has a strong garrison in occupation which has had some nine months to prepare defences. This together with the uncertain climatic conditions makes the operation an improbable one in winter.

31. In regard to 24(f), the occupation of portions of Eire; an effective cocupation would add very much to the efficiency of blockade measures both by sea and ain Britain has considerable forces available in Northern Ireland. Although help is to be expected from the I.R.A. and other German sympathisers in Ireland it would be useless to undertake the invasion without large forces, The maintenance of such forces would not be possible.

The conclusion is that the operation is unlikely, except, possibly, as part of the invasion r the United Kingdom.

*-Gre

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