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The risk is great.
Failure is not necessarily
final failure for Hitler. German propaganda could, for a time at least, make failure appear to have been well worth while because of the tremendous damage inflicted upon England.
It appears certain that every possible effort will be made to bring off a successful invasion of England.
In any event the mere threat of invasion contains military forces in Britain and above all is of inestimable advantage in diverting British naval forces from the essential task of protecting sea communications.
21.
Starvation, if it can be brought to pass, also
It is less certain than means the defeat of England,
Hitler believes invasion and success may be long in coming. that America can, and if necessary will, place great shipping resources at the disposal of England.
22. The present position as known to Hitler must include reliable information regarding the rate of British
He would alse imports of raw materials and food-stuffs.
be able to calculate the rate of consumption and probable stocks.
He would possibly conclude that, even with imports cut off altogether, Great Britain could subsist on her stocks for three months at least.
In addition to this he must know that with 21 million tons of British shipping at the outbreak of war, supplemented by new construction, captures and purchase from the United States of America, the present rate of sinkings presents no immediate danger to the United Kingdom.
Just
23.
It must be anticipated that German air attacks will, if reliance is to be placed upon starvation, show a
A closer co-ordination between change in direction. the German sea and air efforts is to be expected. as the naval effort and some long-range air effort is now directed against shipping so must it be expected will the normal bombing attacks be directed against the contents of these ships at their ports of arrival.
24. Certain subsidiary operations to facilitate the blackade operations which form the basis of starvation plans must be considered.
(a)
(b)
Occupation of such parts of Spain and
Portugal as are necessary to enable the Atlantic ports to be used as naval and air bases and to hinder passage through the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying a region about and north of Tarifa..
The attack on Gibraltar would be a subsidiary object.
The occupation of the Ceuta Peninsula of Spanish Morocco, including the Tangier Zone,
(c) Occupation of, or the use of, Dakar as a
submarine base.
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