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11.

for pressing on with them as soon as possible as we have already stated in our report on Mr. Hull's proposal.

Our best chance of deterring Japan is to give her convincing proof that her action would precipitate hostilities with the U.S.A. as well as the British Empire.

We desire to re-emphasize the view expressed in Paper No. C.0.S. (40) 796 that we should present as bold and determined a front as possible to the Japanese, as any apparent we akness on our part might now have the most dangerous effect on them. The improved prospect of U.S.A. collaboration which has resulted from the pact and the re-opening of the Burma Road will be of material assistance in giving effect to this policy. We would also emphasize that if the Dutch fail to resist, our position in the Far East would be materially weakened. It is therefore of the first importance to ensure that they do resist. Although we alone cannot tie ourselves in advance to support of the Dutch we think we should now come to agreement with the United States that we should together go to the aid of the Netherlands East Indies immediately they were attacked.

Knowledge of this would hearten the Dutch and increase

largely the likelihood of their resisting if attacked.

Furthermore, if Japan knew of this arrangement it would doubtless be a further deterrent to exploits against the Netherlands East Indies.

Recommendations

12.

We recommend that the conclusions arrived at in our report, Paper No. C.0. S. (40) 796, should stand with the following alterations:-

(i) We recommend that paragraph 13(a) of that report should represent our policy in the event of the United States failing to collaborate with us in giving e Pretzel a clear indication that they will join us in supporting the Dutch.

(ii) If the United States is prepared to give this

indication we recommend that our policy should be to go to the aid of the Netherlands East Indies if they are attacked, although we should not tie ourselves positively to this course of action in advance.

(iii) With regard to paragraph 13(c), we consider that the

American reactions to the pact now justify an immediate invitation to the Dutch to join in the conversations about to be held at Singapore, and that the Foreign Office should be requested to make the necessary arrangements.

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Paper No. C.0.S. (40) 802

Cabinet War Room,

7th October, 1940.

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