CAB80-20 — Page 101

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85

U.S.A.

and

It appears to be generally recognised in the United

Their States that the Pact is aimed principally at them. reactions appear to be threerold; a stiffer attitude towards Japan; a desire for closer relations with us; an intensification of material assistance to Great Britain. Moreover, the Administration has suggested that British- American-Dutch staff conversations should be held at an early date.

the 9. The argument that, if engaged in war with Japan, United States would be less able to continue to assist us

The fact of against Germany is probably falacious,

This we

the United States being engaged in war would be a mobilization of her resources on a war basis. believe would ensure an even greater surplus of material for us, as apart from Naval forces the United States is not

likely to require to deploy very large military forces against Japan, and consequently will not expend large material

resources on a Far Eastern war,

EFFECT ON POLICY REGARDING JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

10.

we

The effects of the Pact on the conclusions reached in paragraphs 15(a), (b) and (c) in Paper "The Far East; Policy regarding the Netherlands East Indies"* as follows:

(a)

are

To strengthen our opinion that we should

be compelled to support the Dutch if they resisted a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies.

Our reasons are as follows:

(i)

Cat

The Fact gives us greater reason for supposing that Japanese aggression against the Netherlands East Indies would ultimately be directed against ourselves. If we failed to support the Dutch there would be a gave risk

4 our whole position in the Far East.

(ii) We have now a better chance of obtaining American support and the danger of our having to fight Japan alone is correspondingly reduced. Failure to

support the Dutch would, moreover, seriously alienate American opinion and this might indeed result in our having subsequently to fight the Japanese alone after they were established in the Netherlands East Indies and possibly in Indo-China as well

(b) To increase the urgency of holding staff

conversations with the Dutch.

The prospect of American collaboration would

greatly encourage Dutch resistance and far out- weigh any discouraging effect which our weakness might have. Moreover, some reinforcements are due to arrive in Malaya at the end of October. There is, therefore, no longer any necessity for deferring these conversations, in fact in view of the importance of the time factor there is now every reason

* C.0, C.(40) 796,

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