CAB38-17 — Page 81

Page 81

Page 81

for the most part close to the shore, and as the 5-fathom line lies close to the shore the road is rarely out of range of the guns of warships, and their co-operation would be of great value.

Similarly, a force occupying Nekh! would compel an enemy to be entirely dependent upon Akaba, 80 miles distant, for supplies of every kind, as there is hardly any water on the road between these two places.

27. Of the two cases, El Arish and Nekhl, the former is by far the more important. It lies on the main caravan route from Syria to Egypt, within 14 miles of the Mediterranean seaboard It contains a masonry fort, a large stone-built village with many thousands of palm-trees, and has a large water supply-ample for between 10,000 to 12,000 men. Although the existing fort is badly sited, El Arish could easily be defended with the assistance of warships, and a British force there could easily be provisioned by sea with supplies sent from Port Saïd or Alexandria.

At present the fort at El Arish is unoccupied, except by occasional patrols of native police.

28. At Nekhl the wells, which it is calculated can supply 3,000 camels per diem, are commanded by an old masonry fort, which is occupied by a small garrison consisting of one British officer and 25 men of the Egyptian Army. The roads through Nekhl cannot be utilised by the Turks to the same extent as those through El Arish owing to the difficulty of concentrating a large force at Akaba, which would be the advanced base of a Turkish force adopting this line of invasion. Akaba is 70 miles distant from Maan on the Hedjaz Railway. There are no wells on the route between these two places, and the whole of the water required by a force moving on Akaba would have to be carried or stored in advance at the halting places. Moreover, Akaba, being situated on the coast, would be a vulnerable point on the Turkish communications which could easily be cut here either by warships or by a military force conveyed oversea.

29. The occupation of Nekhl and El Arish would thus be of great value to a force defending the Eastern frontier of Egypt, for an enemy would then be compelled either to capture these places or to march round them. An attempt to capture them would involve delay, which would be valuable to the defending force, by giving time for reinforcements to arrive. While if the enemy avoided El Arish and Nekhl the number of troops that he could move across the Sinai Peninsula would be reduced through the denial to him of the water of the chief oases.

30. It would therefore appear that the occupation of El Arish and Nekhl in the defence of Egypt against a force advancing from the East would be advantageous, not only on pure military grounds, but also for diplomatic reasons, for the risk of complications arising through military operations being undertaken on the Canal would thereby be removed.

It is therefore submitted for consideration whether the arrangements under the Defence Scheme should not be recast so as to provide for the occupation and defence of Nekhil and El Arish.

VI.-Military Measures proposed.

31. If it is decided that the Defence Scheme for the Eastern Frontier of Egypt should be based upon the assumption that Nekhl and El Arish will be defended, it is essential either that these places should be fortified and garrisoned in time of peace, or that our intelligence system should be such as to ensure early warning being received of the movements of Turkish troops in that region, and that arrangements should be made for the rapid occupation of Nekhl and El Arish by British troops in time of strained relations in order that there may be no danger of the Turks forestalling us at these places.

32. Lord Morley's Committee recommended that a road fit for motor traffic should be made from the Suez Canal to Nekhl, and if, after consultation with our Ambas- sador in Constantinople, such a course was considered desirable, that Nekhl should be strengthened and permanently occupied by a small garrison. There is a small garrison at Nekhl, but no steps have hitherto been taken for the construction of the motor road.

Page 81

Page 81