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It is understood that His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General has expressed the opinion that the fortification and occupation of Nekhl at present would involve us in diplomatic difficulties with Turkey which would far outweigh any military advantage we might gain from these measures. It is probable that the fortification and occupation of El Arish in time of peace would for similar reasons be undesirable. It is, therefore, for consideration whether it is practicable to make such arrange- ments as would ensure our being able to occupy Nekhl and El Arish in time of emergency before a Turkish force could reach them,

33. Nekhl is equidistant from Suez and Akaba, being about 80 miles from each of these places. Owing to the bad state of the road between Nekhl and Suez, the time required for troops to reach Nekhl from Suez would be as long as that required for a Turkish force to reach Nekhl from Akaba—about four days.

As reinforcements for Nekhl would have to be brought from Cairo, it seems clear that under present conditions we cannot count upon being able to reinforce Nekhl before a Turkish force could reach that place.

If, however, a road fit for motor traffic were constructed from Suez to Nekhl as recommended by Lord Morley's Committee, reinforcements could probably be conveyed from Cairo to Nekhl in less than forty-eight hours. The construction of a road fit for motor traffic from Suez to Nekhl is therefore essential, if it is decided that that place should be held.

In view of the fact that the route from Maan to Akaba has been surveyed by Ottoman officials with the object of connecting the Turkish port on the Red Sea by a branch line with the Hedjaz Railway, and as it is possible that a concession may be granted by the Turkish Government in the near future to extend the Syrian Railway system to the Egyptian frontier, it is thought that the construction of a road to Nekhil would not give Turkey just cause for complaint. Moreover, as Nekhl is now occupied by a small garrison, it might be possible to justify the construction of the road on the grounds of present peace requirements.

34. El Arish is about 25 miles from Rafaa, on the Turko-Egyptian frontier. A Turkish force might therefore reach El Arish about twenty-four hours after our having received warning that it had crossed the frontier.

El Arish being close to the sea, the most economical and rapid way of conveying troops there from Cairo would be by train to Port Saïd and thence by ship to El Arish. Even if arrangements are carefully worked out in peace, it is probable that we could not ensure the arrival of reinforcements at El Arish within forty-eight hours of a warning being received of a Turkish advance.

It is almost inevitable therefore, unless earlier warning of Turkish movements can be assured or unless El Arish can be fortified and garrisoned in time of peace, so as to enable it to hold out for two or three days, that the Turks would be able to forestall our troops there.

VII.-Naval Co-operation.

35. Lord Morley's Committee on the Defence of Egypt expressed the opinion that at a time when relations with Turkey are in any way strained, there should be sufficient naval force in the vicinity of Egypt to enable the navy to co-operate in the defence of the Suez Canal. This recommendation has, however, been superseded by the conclusion of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (see paragraph 6 above), that for diplomatic reasons naval action in the Canal must be avoided, except in case of extreme emergency.

36. As regards the possibility of guaranteeing naval co-operation in oversea military operations, it may be pointed out that the Admiralty, in order that they may not be hampered in their efforts to assert our maritime supremacy over the enemy's fleets, have always reserved to themselves the absolute power of disposing their forces in the manner they consider most certain to ensure success, and they object to limit the action of any part of them to the immediate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by operations at a distance. In no circumstances, therefore, can they give a guarantee that ships would be available for any particular purpose, or that the safe transport of troops by sea could be effected at any particular time after the outbreak of war with a maritime Power.

As a military attack on Egypt from the direction of the Sinai Peninsula might take place at a time when no British men-of-war were within several days' steaming

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