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practice of "interchangeable commanders"--a striking departure from the personalistic command structure of yung-ying armies such as Chou's. Moreover, the Tientsin academy provided a large pool of new talent for modernizing purposes, men whose "careers were grounded in change" and whose "qualifying education and . . . prominence were owed to reform."112 Many Tientsin Military Academy graduates became instructors in other military schools established after 1895;113 several prominent engineers were produced by the academy;114 and of course many of the most famous political and military leaders of the early Republic—including Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Juo-chang, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, Chang Huai-chih and many others—were Tientsin Military Academy graduates.
In short, significant changes in Chinese military education took place prior to 1895, despite the absence of meaningful reform in either the civil or military examinations and numerous other problems.116 Nonetheless, it took the successive humiliations of the Sino-Japanese War, the "Scramble for Concessions," and the Boxer fiasco to prompt the Ch'ing dynasty into fundamental military reform,117 And even then, "national" policies were often implemented piecemeal at the local level.118
In retrospect, it seems evident that the obstacles to meaningful reform in Chinese military education were less ideological than institutional. To be certain, Confucian critics of new-style training programs could always be found, especially after the establishment of modern military academies in China during the 1880's.120 But the throne's lack of enthusiasm for military reform along Western lines certainly cannot be explained in terms of ideology alone. In the first place, it must be remembered that little if anything in the way of Confucian learning had ever been expected of regular Ch'ing military officers. Paradoxically, it was in the innovative yung-ying armies, about which the throne had very mixed feelings, rather than the Green Standard and Banner forces of the empire, that the inculcation of Confucian virtues received special stress. Moreover, officials such as Chang Chih-tung, and even the pragmatic Li Hung-chang, emphasized the importance of Confucian education not only in their own "personal" armies but also in their new-style military academies.12 Surely, the subordinate officers of Chang and Li were no less "Confucian" than their Green Standard and Banner counterparts.
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practice of "interchangeable commanders"--a striking departure from the personalistic command structure of yung-ying armies such as Chou's. Moreover, the Tientsin academy provided a large pool of new talent for modernizing purposes, men whose "careers were grounded in change" and whose "qualifying education and . . . pro- minence were owed to reform."112 Many Tientsin Military Academy graduates became instructors in other military schools established after 1895;113 several prominent engineers were produced by the academy;114 and of course many of the most famous political and military leaders of the early Republic-including Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Juo-chang, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, Chang Huai-chih and many others-were Tientsin Military Academy graduates.s
In short, significant changes in Chinese military education took place prior to 1895, despite the absence of meaningful reform in either the civil or military examinations and numerous other pro- blems.116 Nonetheless, it took the successive humiliations of the Sino-Japanese War, the "Scramble for Concessions," and the Boxer fiasco to prompt the Ch'ing dynasty into fundamental military re- form,117 And even then, "national" policies were often implemented piecemeal at the local level.118
In retrospect, it seems evident that the obstacles to meaningful reform in Chinese military education were less ideological than institutional. To be certain, Confucian critics of new-style train- ing programs could always be found, especially after the establish- ment of modern military academies in China during the 1880's,120 But the throne's lack of enthusiasm for military reform along Wes- tern lines certainly cannot be explained in terms of ideology alone. In the first place, it must be remembered that little if anything in the way of Confucian learning had ever been expected of regular Ch'ing military officers. Paradoxically, it was in the innovative yung-ying armies, about which the throne had very mixed feelings, rather than the Green Standard and Banner forces of the empire, that the inculcation of Confucian virtues received special stress. Moreover, officials such as Chang Chih-tung, and even the pragmatic Li Hung-chang, emphasized the importance of Confucian education not only in their own "personal" armies but also in their new-style military academies.12 Surely, the subordinate officers of Chang and Li were no less "Confucian" than their Green Standard and Banner counterparts.
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