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Chinese society.103 The new content of military education, which emphasized technical skills and diluted traditional values and loyalties somewhat, created a new professional elite that was significantly different in outlook from even such relatively progressive (and rare) individuals as Chou Sheng-chuan.104 For all his innovativeness, Chou remained bound by the inhibiting institutional structure of the Anhwei Army as well as the limits of his own educational experience within that force. As a result, he was never able to resolve certain fundamental conflicts in his self-image, attitude, and approach toward military affairs and reform.105
One is tempted to see in Chou the tensions of becoming "modern" and remaining "Chinese" suggested by Joseph Levenson, and even a kind of nineteenth-century version of the "red versus expert" dilemma of more recent times. Although Chou obviously admired Western military organization and repeatedly solicited foreign military advice, he was also anxious to demonstrate that the Chinese yung-ying model was in many respects equivalent or superior to the Western model, and he often reacted quite defensively to foreign criticisms.106 Chou admired foreign technology (at one point maintaining that bullets were more important than rations), but he also repeatedly stressed the human factor in warfare, down-playing on occasion foreign advantages in organization and weapons, emphasizing the importance of "will" (chih-ch'i), and periodically suggesting to Li Hung-chang the utility of rapidly recruiting volunteers (i-yung) and employing them as "surprise troops" (ch'i-ping).107
Obsessed with the need for intensive drill, Chou nonetheless continually employed the Sheng-chün in non-military tasks which undoubtedly compromised its fighting effectiveness—work on military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ien), land reclamation, flood and famine relief work, and so forth.108 Finally, although Chou seems to have considered himself to be a professional soldier, and was anxious to foster positive attitudes toward the military, he, like virtually all of his fellow officers and commanders, esteemed civil status and sought identification with the civil bureaucracy.109
The more genuinely professional education provided by the Tientsin Military Academy after Chou's death helped resolve some of the tensions that seem to have plagued Chou.110 Certainly, it allowed the many Tientsin-trained commanders in Yüan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang Army to accept more readily the modern principle and
MILITARY EDUCATION in CHINA, 1842-1895
31
Chinese society.103 The new content of military education, which emphasized technical skills and diluted traditional values and loyal- ties somewhat, created a new professional elite that was significantly different in outlook from even such relatively progressive (and rare) individuals as Chou Sheng-chuan.104 For all his innovativeness, Chou remained bound by the inhibiting institutional structure of the Anhwei Army as well as the limits of his own educational ex- perience within that force. As a result, he was never able to resolve certain fundamental conflicts in his self-image, attitude, and ap- proach toward military affairs and reform, 105
One is tempted to see in Chou the tensions of becoming "mo- dern" and remaining "Chinese" suggested by Joseph Levenson, and even a kind of nineteenth century version of the "red versus expert" dilemma of more recent times. Although Chou obviously admired Western military organization and repeatedly solicited foreign mili- tary advice, he was also anxious to demonstrate that the Chinese yung-ying model was in many respects equivalent or superior to the Western model, and he often reacted quite defensively to foreign criticisms.106 Chou admired foreign technology (at one point main- taining that bullets were more important than rations), but he also repeatedly stressed the human factor in warfare, down-playing on occasion foreign advantages in organization and weapons, empha- sizing the importance of "will" (chih-ch'i), and periodically sugges- ting to Li Hung-chang the utility of rapidly recruiting volunteers (i-yung) and employing them as "surprise troops" (ch'i-ping),107 Obsessed with the need for intensive drill, Chou nonetheless con- tinually employed the Sheng-chün in non-military tasks which un- doubtedly compromised its fighting effectiveness-work on military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ien), land reclamation, flood and famine relief work, and so forth.108 Finally, although Chou seems to have considered himself to be a professional soldier, and was anxious to foster positive attitudes toward the military, he, like virtually all of his fellow officers and commanders, esteemed civil status and sought identification with the civil bureaucracy,109
The more genuinely professional education provided by the Tientsin Military Academy after Chou's death helped resolve some of the tensions that seem to have plagued Chou.110 Certainly it allowed the many Tientsin-trained commanders in Yüan Shih-k’ai's Peiyang Army to accept more readily the modern principle and
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