RAS-1978 — Page 49

RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 All AI Reviewed

MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895

33

The major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted support to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills.122 It is true, of course, that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-particularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces.

Ironically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchu sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynasty might have been able to build a Meiji-style system of military education and dispense with foreign instructors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch'ing government by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style military force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on internal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time "dwarf bandits" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences.

NOTES

Abbreviations:

CJCC - Chung-Jih chan-cheng

CWCK - Ch'ou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu

FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States

IWSM - Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo

LWCK - Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi

NCH - North-China Herald

YWYT - Yang-wu yün-tung

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MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895 33 The major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted support to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills.122 It is true, of course, that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-particularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces. Ironically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchu sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynasty might have been able to build a Meiji-style system of military education and dispense with foreign instructors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch'ing government by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style military force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on internal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time "dwarf bandits" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences. NOTES Abbreviations: CJCC - Chung-Jih chan-cheng CWCK - Ch'ou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States IWSM - Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo LWCK - Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi NCH - North-China Herald YWYT - Yang-wu yün-tung
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MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895 33 The major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted sup- port to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills. 122 It is true, of course. that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-par- ticularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces. Ironically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchus sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynnasty might have been able to build a Meiji- style system of military education and dispense with foreign instruc- tors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch’ing govern- ment by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style mili- tary force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on inter- nal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time "dwarf bandits" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences. NOTES Abbreviations: CJCC CWCK FRUS IWSM LWCK NCH YWYT Chung-Jih chan-cheng Chou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu Foreign Relations of the United States Ch'ow-pan i-wu shih-mo Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi North-China Herald Yang-wu yün-tung
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MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895

33

The major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted sup- port to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills. 122 It is true, of course. that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-par- ticularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces.

Ironically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchus sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynnasty might have been able to build a Meiji- style system of military education and dispense with foreign instruc- tors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch’ing govern- ment by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style mili- tary force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on inter- nal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time "dwarf bandits" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences.

NOTES

Abbreviations:

CJCC

CWCK

FRUS

IWSM

LWCK

NCH YWYT

Chung-Jih chan-cheng

Chou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu

Foreign Relations of the United States

Ch'ow-pan i-wu shih-mo

Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi

North-China Herald

Yang-wu yün-tung

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