TNAG-2918-FCO40-4193-The-internationalisation-issue--Hong-Kong-Department-paper---1993 — Page 30

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But

remains. We should keep it in reserve in case relations with

China deteriorated further and Hong Kong opinion favoured

enlisting wider support irrespective of China's reactions.

we should not underestimate the difficulty of securing agreement

from some of our partners (eg Japan in the G7 and Third World

countries in CHOGM) unless Chinese behaviour is again such as to

cause international outrage.

18. Initiating debate on Hong Kong in the UN would be a very high-profile challenge to China. It would also be high-risk.

Some countries could seek to reopen the self determination issue.

This might in extremis trigger an early Chinese takeover (almost certainly not the case with the other options discussed in this

paper). China in any case has a veto in the Security Council,

and has not accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. However, we might wish to consider a wider UN

monitoring role post 1997. For example, the fact that the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to be

applied to the Hong Kong SAR will give a locus for UN monitoring

of human rights issues. Whether we pursued such high-profile

options would depend on whether, at the time, we felt there was

no alternative to public confrontation as a means of applying pressure on China.

HONG KONG DEPARTMENT

25 February 1993

internat.NAT

JEB

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