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But
remains. We should keep it in reserve in case relations with
China deteriorated further and Hong Kong opinion favoured
enlisting wider support irrespective of China's reactions.
we should not underestimate the difficulty of securing agreement
from some of our partners (eg Japan in the G7 and Third World
countries in CHOGM) unless Chinese behaviour is again such as to
cause international outrage.
18. Initiating debate on Hong Kong in the UN would be a very high-profile challenge to China. It would also be high-risk.
Some countries could seek to reopen the self determination issue.
This might in extremis trigger an early Chinese takeover (almost certainly not the case with the other options discussed in this
paper). China in any case has a veto in the Security Council,
and has not accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. However, we might wish to consider a wider UN
monitoring role post 1997. For example, the fact that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to be
applied to the Hong Kong SAR will give a locus for UN monitoring
of human rights issues. Whether we pursued such high-profile
options would depend on whether, at the time, we felt there was
no alternative to public confrontation as a means of applying pressure on China.
HONG KONG DEPARTMENT
25 February 1993
internat.NAT
JEB
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