CONFIDENTIAL
as the end of 1993, although considerable differences of view do
remain between China and key GATT parties over the terms of the
protocol. While there is scope to influence the timing of
Chinese re-accession, and indeed the outcome, there are
constraints on us. Our traditional position has been to avoid
taking positions in GATT on the basis of political
considerations. We also have to work through the Commission, who
represent the Community and have competence in this area.
A
15. The US position on GATT re-accession will be crucial.
formal US/China bilateral will be held on 1 March (the first
since 1989). The Americans intend to take the Chinese through
what needs to be done if China is to achieve accession to GATT.
We should keep in touch with this process which could offer some
leverage.
16. We should continue our policy of briefing other partners.
Several have economic interests in Hong Kong which give them both an incentive and a locus for quiet intervention with the Chinese. We should encourage them to speak quietly to the Chinese as
opportunity arises, invoking their own stake in Hong Kong rather
than our policies.
17.
Declaratory policy, eg through G7 or CHOGM, would remind
China of international concern about their policies towards Hong
Kong. But it would tend to feed Chinese conspiracy theories
(they have already drawn a link between the Governor's
constitutional package and what they see as US efforts to
undermine the present Chinese regime). The Chinese will be bound
to react very strongly, to a point where chances of a cooperative relationship over Hong Kong for the last years up to 1997 will be
further reduced. It could also cause unease in Hong Kong; as 1997 approaches sensitivity to third countries rocking the boat is likely to increase. A higher declaratory profile would therefore be better avoided while hope of dialogue with China
internat.NAT
JEB
CONFIDENTIAL
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