TNAG-2794-FCO40-4034-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Taiwan-1993 — Page 136

CONFIDENTIAL

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3.

The Secretary of State approved a revision of our guidelines

on defence equipment sales to Taiwan shortly before the Election.

Nothing has since changed to require any fundamental revision of the

policy so soon afterwards. The main substantive change over

previous policy was to expand the scope for use of third country channels for sale of technology and parts. There is a provision for

approval of dual-use equipment when the end-user is civilian. The

guidelines (like any such licensing arrangement) inevitably leave a

large grey area where we need to ex ercise our di scretion. We have

now, involving airfield damage repair equipment.

such a case

4.

The initial application for export of this equipment was made

on 30 January this year by Moral Consultants, a consultancy firm

acting on behalf of a group of companies. It was made in the form of an Arms Working Party Application (AWP). Approval of an AWP lets

the applicant know that an Export Licence for his product would

probably be granted if one were applied for, but does not commit HMG

to granting an Export Licence.

5.

The equipment is designed primarily to allow the rapid repair

of runways damaged by bombs, thereby allowing aircraft to take off

from and land on them. Bomb craters are filled with rubble and

cement, which is then compacted down, and are then covered with tensioned steel matting. The equipment is destined for a military

end-user,

the Taiwan Air Force.

6.

Applications to FED for approval of exports to Taiwan are

considered under the terms of the guidelines approved by Ministers

on 5 March 1992. This application was refused on the basis that it

would enhance the capability of the Taiwan Armed Forces, and

therefore contravened our guidelines.

CONFIDENTIAL