CONFIDENTIAL
A
3.
The Secretary of State approved a revision of our guidelines
on defence equipment sales to Taiwan shortly before the Election.
Nothing has since changed to require any fundamental revision of the
policy so soon afterwards. The main substantive change over
previous policy was to expand the scope for use of third country channels for sale of technology and parts. There is a provision for
approval of dual-use equipment when the end-user is civilian. The
guidelines (like any such licensing arrangement) inevitably leave a
large grey area where we need to ex ercise our di scretion. We have
now, involving airfield damage repair equipment.
such a case
4.
The initial application for export of this equipment was made
on 30 January this year by Moral Consultants, a consultancy firm
acting on behalf of a group of companies. It was made in the form of an Arms Working Party Application (AWP). Approval of an AWP lets
the applicant know that an Export Licence for his product would
probably be granted if one were applied for, but does not commit HMG
to granting an Export Licence.
5.
The equipment is designed primarily to allow the rapid repair
of runways damaged by bombs, thereby allowing aircraft to take off
from and land on them. Bomb craters are filled with rubble and
cement, which is then compacted down, and are then covered with tensioned steel matting. The equipment is destined for a military
end-user,
the Taiwan Air Force.
6.
Applications to FED for approval of exports to Taiwan are
considered under the terms of the guidelines approved by Ministers
on 5 March 1992. This application was refused on the basis that it
would enhance the capability of the Taiwan Armed Forces, and
therefore contravened our guidelines.
CONFIDENTIAL