3. Russia: Baltics: suspension of troop
withdrawals adds to tension between local authorities and Russian troops. Russians impose economic sanctions to pressurize Balts into
relaxing citizenship laws. Agitation for military
intervention to protect Russian minorities;
deterioration in
sharp
Russian/Latvian relations.
4.
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Russia: economy: non-implementation or failure of the economic reform programme: hyperinflation and plummeting industrial output. Debt-rescheduling and IFI balance of payments assistance at risk.
5. Yugoslavia: Bosnia. Breakdown in peace process or of ceasefire reached as part of an agreement; or US air-strikes.
6.
Yugoslavia: Croatia. Major upsurge in fighting with large-scale involvement by Belgrade.
One
Interests not directly affected but there would be strong popular sympathy for the Baltic States. likely result would be a strengthening of reactionary and nationalist forces in Russia and a slowdown in reform. We could come under increasing pressure to give security guarantees to the CEES.
Economic assistance from the IFI in 1992, debt rescheduling, and Western economic assistance generally in 1993 is conditional on Russia agreeing and sticking to an IMF agreed reform programme. Failure would delay Russian integration into international economic structures and damage British trade.
Risks to UNPROFOR troops or peacekeeping forces implementing an agreement. Risk of spillover.
Risk to UNPROFOR troops. Risk of spillover, eg if Belgrade Serbs were overtly involved.
We have discussed this with close allies. Western contact group is in operation to promote agreement between the Russians and the Baltic states.
Working with IMF and other Western governments to encourage a satisfactory reform programme. Much would depend on the reasons for eventual non-implementation and on the alternative policies followed by the Russian government.
New York talks. Pressure on parties.
Geneva peace talks. Pressure on parties.
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