TNAG-2611-FCO40-3802-International-support-from-the-USA-regarding-the-future-of-H-1992 — Page 58

CONFIDENTIAL

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MDTTAN 2550

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES POST-1997, WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COVER CERTAIN AREAS TO CHINA EG HAINAN ISLAND FROM HONG KONG RATHER THAN GUANGZHOU, TO MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO EXERCISE ANY CONTROL OVER HONG KONG, SIPHON OFF ITS RESOURCES OR ATTEMPT TO CHANGE ASPECTS OF ITS LEGAL OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

EMPHASISING THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON AN ENTIRELY PERSONAL BASIS

I MADE A FEW GENERAL POINTS.

A) WHILE WE APPRECIATE AMERICAN INTEREST IN HONG KONG'S FUTURE THE UK INTENDED TO REMAIN AN EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG UNTIL 30 JUNE 1997. THE CHINESE WOULD BE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AT ANY

IMPRESSION OF THIRD COUNTRIES LOBBYING ON HONG KONG'S BEHALF.

B) THERE WERE MANY AREAS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE WISE NOT TO PUT THE CHINESE ON THE SPOT BY ASKING INCONVENIENT QUESTIONS. THE TENDENCY

TO DRAW ANALOGIES BETWEEN HONG KONG'S FUTURE PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

AND THAT NOW PREVAILING IN SOUTHERN CHINA IGNORED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE BASIC LAW. HONG KONG'S SITUATION WAS UNIQUE AND WHILE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF CREEP WAS TO

BE EXPECTED THERE WERE VERY CLEAR OBLIGATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN ASSUMED BY THE CHINESE SIDE IN THE JD WHICH CHINA WOULD NOT BE KEEN TO BE SEEN BREAKING IN PUBLIC. THE DEMONSTRATION EFFECT ON TAIWAN

WAS ALSO RELEVANT.

5. IF THE US FELT OBLIGED TO PUT CERTAIN QUESTIONS TO THE CHINESE

ALMOST ALL WOULD BEST BE HELD BACK UNTIL MUCH NEARER 1997. THE

SITUATION WAS STILL VERY FLUID AND CHINESE POLICY AND PRACTICE

WOULD CONTINUE TO EVOLVE.

6. PASCOE'S PATTERN OF QUESTIONING WAS FAIRLY DISORGANISED BUT

BEHIND IT SEEMED TO LIE THE PRESUMPTION OF A WORST CASE SCENARIO.

I ENCOURAGED HIM TO TEST OUT HIS IDEAS ON THE AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF, ONCE THEY HAD BEGUN TO CLARIFY, BEFORE TRANSMISSION TO WASHINGTON. I EXPLAINED THAT IN CERTAIN AREAS OUR OWN THINKING HAD YET TO COALESCE. THERE WAS NOT A 'ROAD MAP FOR EVERY PROBLEM OF THE TRANSITION. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON CHINESE ACCEPTANCE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND THE WORKING

RELATIONSHIP TO BE DEVELOPED BETWEEN A NEW-STYLE LEGCO AND THE HONG

KONG GOVERNMENT. ON THIS THE OMENS WERE ALREADY GOOD. FINALLY I

MADE THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WORST CASE

SCENARIO WAS IN DANGER OF A BECOMING SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.