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CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING
TO TELELETTER HONG KONG
TELELETTER N FR
OF 130824Z FEBRUARY 92
AND TO TELELETTER UKREP JLG HONG KONG, F C 0, WASHINGTON
FROM
TELELETTER
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR
COPIED PERSONAL FOR
D COATES, PEKING
NFR OF 13 FEBRUARY 1992
W G EHRMAN, HONG KONG
AR PAUL, UKREP JLG HONG KONG PF RICKETTS, HKD, FCO
H LL DAVIES, FED, FCO SD PATTISON, WASHINGTON
POST-1997 US PRESENCE IN HONG KONG
1. IN FOLLOW UP TO THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR AND STAPLETON ROY REPORTED IN THE AMBASSADOR'S TELELETTER OF 29 JANUARY TO PETER RICKETTS, THE US DHM ASKED FOR A SESSION TO DISCUSS IN GENERAL TERMS OUR THINKING ON LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS IN
HONG KONG OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS.
2.
PASCOE EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS TO HELP THE EMBASSY IN THEIR PREPARATION OF A US EMBASSY PEKING INPUT ON HOW THE US SHOULD PLAN TO HANDLE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH HONG KONG
POST-1997. ANOTHER THEME WAS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE US SHOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT THROUGH DIRECT REPRESENTATIONS
IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE HANDOVER DATE. PASCOE ENVISAGED THE EMBASSY PREPARING A REPORT TOWARDS THE END OF MARCH WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AIMING TO PULL TOGETHER ITS THINKING ON SUCH QUESTIONS BY AUTUMN THIS YEAR. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE US STILL REGARDS HONG
KONG AS LARGELY A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY AND IT HAD NO WISH TO TAKE ON ANOTHER PROBLEM IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE. NEVERTHELESS THE US WAS KEEN TO ADDRESS CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, WHICH WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER AND OTHER RESOURCES IN TIME TO PREPARE ADEQUATELY FOR THE HANDOVER IN 1997. PASCOE WAS UNSIGHTED AS TO WHETHER THE US CONSULATE-GENERAL IN HONG KONG HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT IN A PARALLEL
APPROACH.
3.
MUCH OF PASCOE'S CONVERSATION COVERED GROUND ALREADY BROACHED WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON 27 JANUARY. US CONCERNS RANGED FROM
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