CONFIDENTIAL
112721
MDTTAN 2550
COMMENT
7.
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER PASCOE'S APPROACH IS DRIVEN BY THOSE IN
THE STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES (PASCOE EXPLAINED THERE WAS INTENSE PRESSURE ON FUNDING AVAILABLE
TO SUPPORT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS FOR EAST ASIA) OR BY MORE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS THAT AMERICAN INTEREST IN HONG KONG, PRIMARILY COMMERCIAL, WOULD BE THREATENED BY THE TRANSITION IN 1997. THE US CLEARLY ASSUMES THAT CERTAIN OF ITS CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG (EG, ON THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING SIDE)
MAY HAVE TO BE MOVED AND IN ANY CASE IS SCEPTICAL OF THE NEED TO
RUN A LARGE STAFF OF CHINA ANALYSTS. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW
IF THE US HAVE MADE SIMILAR APPROACHES IN HONG KONG OR LONDON.
PASCOE EXPLAINED THE STATE DEPARTMENT ITSELF WOULD NOT BE DRAFTING
ON ANY OF THE INITIAL PAPERS.
8.
I AM COPYING THIS TELELETTER TO A.R. PAUL, UKREP JLG HONG KONG, P.F. RICKETTS, H K D, F C O, H.LL. DAVIES, F E D, F C O AND TO S.D. PATTISON AT WASHINGTON.
H K D REGISTRY, F C O PLEASE PASS TO FED, F C 0.
D. COATES.
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