SECRET UK EYES A
LOCSEN
ITEM 4 UPDATE ON WITHDRAWAL OF FIRST GURKHA BATTALION IN 1992
32. Hd Sec (0) (C) started by saying that a submission had been made to Min (AF) requesting Ministers to inform the Chinese and fix a date for a political announcement. commented that it was important to confirm to the Chinese before an announcement in Parliament. Col ASD 1 stated that it was essential that the decision was announced by the end of July, if the amalgamation was to go ahead in good order. Mr Paul opined that the Chinese should be given at least one week's notice.
33. ACOS J3 BFHK then explained how the mechanics of the "withdrawal" would work. He stated that studies had been made to determine the most effective way of amalgamating 1/2 & 2/2GR. The main principles were:
a.
D.
C.
Operational effectiveness must not be adversely affected in HK, UK or Brunei.
Rundown of excess manpower would concentrate on early retirement of the high Gurkha recruit intake of the years 1979/80/81 (across the whole brigade). Surplus 2GR manpower would be redistributed across the whole brigade.
34. The outline programme would be as follows:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
April 1992: early Arms Plot move of 2/2GR from Brunei to HK.
April 1992: 2/2GR go non-operational in HK. April - September 1992: manpower released on redundancy replaced on trickle posting basis from 1/2 & 2/2GR.
September 1992: Amalgamation of 2 GR.
September 1992 - March 1993: Surplus 2 GR manpower redistributed across Brigade of Gurkhas.
35. The implications of the amalgamation were:
a.
b.
Funding by HKG within the DCA of both 1/2 & 2/2GR should not be expected after September 1992. BFHK would give up Burma Lines to the RHKP in October 1992 retaining some MQS.
C:\WP50\HONGKONG\STEERING\06JUN91.MIN
Page 10 of 12
UK EYES A SECRET
pages
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.