TNAG-2209-FCO40-3169-Future-of-Hong-Kong-principal-officials-1991 — Page 8

SECRET 高度機密

(a)

We do not

demandeur.

get ourselves into the

us.

position of The pressure is on the Chinese, not

If anything goes wrong, it is the Chinese that bear$

the greatest consequence.

There are probably sufficient indication that the Chinese

are anxious to make an early start. While we can signal that we are not totally adverse to enter into discussions, we should let the Chinese make

be prepared, but not show

move.

the

anxiety.

(b) The

Let us

Chinese needs Our cooperation, e.g. to identify potential principal officials, to disclosure information, to allow them ready access (to carry out "united front" activities) to senior officials, and (ultimately) to accept their

nominees.

We must extract the maximum price for these concessions, stage by stage. The sort of

prices that we might try to extract from the

Chinese are:

(i)

"joint selection" at our measured pace;

more into

contact with the

(ii) work with Us in an effort to bring potential

principal officials

Chinese, but to refrain from putting too much pressure on these officials;

(iii) a solution in principle to the nationality/right

problem, before we are prepared who have what kind of "assurance"

of

abode

disclosfe

to

Redacted Under FOI

Exemption Sec 27(1)

G.F. J16

(iv) to

accept

outsiders into

last resort.

that

introduction of Chinese nominated

the civil service should be the

SECRET #3

σ