SECRET 高度機密
(a)
We do not
demandeur.
get ourselves into the
us.
position of The pressure is on the Chinese, not
If anything goes wrong, it is the Chinese that bear$
the greatest consequence.
There are probably sufficient indication that the Chinese
are anxious to make an early start. While we can signal that we are not totally adverse to enter into discussions, we should let the Chinese make
be prepared, but not show
move.
the
anxiety.
(b) The
Let us
Chinese needs Our cooperation, e.g. to identify potential principal officials, to disclosure information, to allow them ready access (to carry out "united front" activities) to senior officials, and (ultimately) to accept their
nominees.
We must extract the maximum price for these concessions, stage by stage. The sort of
prices that we might try to extract from the
Chinese are:
(i)
"joint selection" at our measured pace;
more into
contact with the
(ii) work with Us in an effort to bring potential
principal officials
Chinese, but to refrain from putting too much pressure on these officials;
(iii) a solution in principle to the nationality/right
problem, before we are prepared who have what kind of "assurance"
of
abode
disclosfe
to
Redacted Under FOI
Exemption Sec 27(1)
G.F. J16
(iv) to
accept
outsiders into
last resort.
that
introduction of Chinese nominated
the civil service should be the
SECRET #3
σ