TNAG-2209-FCO40-3169-Future-of-Hong-Kong-principal-officials-1991 — Page 7

G.F J16

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account in our planning.

10.

5

In order to minimise discontinuity, we must seek to persuade the Chinese that:

(a)

not

only maximum continuity is desirable, but that they do not need to put in their nominees into the

senior ranks of the civil service because they

already have sufficient. degree of control and

influence, post-1997, of the senior civil

service.

In particular the Chief Executive

recommends their appointment to the CPG and

directs their work. The MFA Office monitors and

advises over aspects of their work which has a

foreign policy dimension.

Committees which may themselves consist of

Key boards and

pro-China elements will influence

decisions.

their policy

11.

(b)

(at least at the initial

there will be plenty of Chinese,

through various

stage of discussion)

opportunities for the

ways, of satisfying

themselves that the potential pool of senior civil servants capable of becoming principal officials

are acceptable to them; thus

(c)

any

precipitate action/pronouncement on their part would create instability within the senior ranks

of the civil service. This will not only be not

conducive to a smooth transition, but would create

difficulties for the maintenance of stability (and

hence) prosperity in the transitional years. The

British side will not tolerate this: and

(a) they must take a more reasonable attitude to the question of nationality/right of abode requirement

of potential principal officials, and particular the position of their dependents.

In

in

terns of tactics, it is recommended that we adopt

Acting

the following course of course:

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