CF 316
(b)
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4
would probably be brought to accept the provision of non-confidential personal data to Chinese.
as
They would probably baulk at the provision to the Chinese, at this stage, of confidential data such performance appraisal reports. In particular, they would not accept the disclosure to the Chinese, at this stage, of their position vis-a-vis the British Nationality Scheme. (It is
for consideration whether disclosure of such
information to
anyone, without the specific agreement of the officer concerned, constitutes an offence under the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act or its related Hong Kong legislation, or the Bill of Rights.)
(c) Mast officers would probably accept the need, in
the next few years, to put in some effort to
familiarise themselves with China and relevant
to acquire the necessary
Chinese officials, and
skills.
sufficient opportunities
(The problem
is, whether there are and incentives for doing
so.)
(a)
Some officers may be
right of refuge
persuaded to give up their
if
have definitely been
principal official.
they were told that they
identified as a future
None would however be
prepared to accept a similar requirement for their
spouse and children.
RECOMMENDATIONS
9.
objective, in
But in light of the
that the Chinese will
Redacted Under FOI Exemption Sec 27(1)
NO TO
ensure
It is axiomatic that the British side's Overall
simple terms, is to achieve maximum continuity. foregoing analysis, it cannot be assumed share the same objective. The Chinese
but not $0 much that this would take
minimum standards of "loyalty".
will value continuity,
precedence over
their
So
discontinuity to an extent should be a factor to be taken into
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up to 19
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