TNAG-2209-FCO40-3169-Future-of-Hong-Kong-principal-officials-1991 — Page 5

(d)

2

n

to test the officers' ability to develop a working relationship with Chinese officials, and their pliability to Chinese wishes;

carry out intensive "united front" type approaches to these potential principal officials;

(e)

press us to arrange for speedy advancement of those officers whom they could "turn", if these officers are not already in senior positions; and

6.

(£) at any stage where they feel the need, press the HKG to take on board pro-China "outsiders" into appropriate positions.

This

strategy, of course, also allows the Chinese

or otherwise) to increase their degree of decision-making process within the HKG in the ahead. That may well also be an important

(incidentally influence in the transitional years objective for them.

**

Civil Service attitudes and expectations

1.

Here

reasonably

Redacted Under FOI Exemption Sec 27(1)

also there are few hard facts, but some consistent impressions.

G.F. 316

8.

We consider however that despite the shortage of hard evidence, the following conclusions may reasonably be stated:

(a) Most senior local officers would accept "joint selection" at sone stage, but they would prefer this to be done later. In the meantime, they

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