TNAG-2209-FCO40-3169-Future-of-Hong-Kong-principal-officials-1991 — Page 51

SECRET Ã☀Z

14

Administrative

Service) whose careers may take

them ultimately to this level (whereas HKG has

abandoned its nationality requirements);

(c)

The CPG will find it easiest to endorse civil

servants who find ways to cooperate with the

United Front before 1997 and do not "oppose"

PRC (whereas HKG's security vetting

procedures traditionally have regarded such

attitudes with suspicion); and

the

(d) Ultimately, the CPG will

make its own

judgment as to which individuals

are

personally acceptable to the CPG or in

sympathy with its own views (which is a

consideration beyond HKG's competence).

HKG'S LIMITED OPTIONS

20.

HKG's most

difficult choice is whether or not to

campaign to convince the CPG to accept a "through train" for

sovereignty-sensitive posts:

(a)

HKG could make

guaranteed

the case that without

continuity post-1997 for the

G.F. 316

SECRET 高度機密