SECRET Ã☀Z
14
Administrative
Service) whose careers may take
them ultimately to this level (whereas HKG has
abandoned its nationality requirements);
(c)
The CPG will find it easiest to endorse civil
servants who find ways to cooperate with the
United Front before 1997 and do not "oppose"
PRC (whereas HKG's security vetting
procedures traditionally have regarded such
attitudes with suspicion); and
the
(d) Ultimately, the CPG will
make its own
judgment as to which individuals
are
personally acceptable to the CPG or in
sympathy with its own views (which is a
consideration beyond HKG's competence).
HKG'S LIMITED OPTIONS
20.
HKG's most
difficult choice is whether or not to
campaign to convince the CPG to accept a "through train" for
sovereignty-sensitive posts:
(a)
HKG could make
guaranteed
the case that without
continuity post-1997 for the
G.F. 316
SECRET 高度機密