TNAG-2110-FCO40-3009-Hong-Kong-participation-in-international-organisations-1990 — Page 291

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above, we indicate our willingness at Ottawa to see Bermuda and the

Caribbean territories included but say that before we can make any

commitment we shall need to consult their local governments.

7. As regards our remoter territories, the Falkland Islands and

Pitcairn have no East/West arms control interest and are manifestly

outside the geographical area which NATO has proposed. In the case

of the Falklands separate confidence-building measures have just

been negotiated after some difficulty with the Argentinians. I do

not think we will be challenged over their exclusion. On British

Indian Ocean Territory our position is flexible: we have no

objections from a military point of view to overflights and have

heard that US do not either. But there are grounds for excluding

BIOT and Ascension Island on the basis that this helps maintain the argument about geographical scope in relation to the Falkland Islands. On balance, I think the argument lies in favour of being as open as possible, especially since BIOT and Ascension contain US military bases and US are permitting a wide degree of access to

their own territory. I recommend we include these two, subject to

confirming formally that US have no objections.

8.

The biggest difficulties arise with Hong Kong which is covered

under any interpretation of geographical scope. We would need to

seek Chinese agreement in principle to the inclusion of Hong Kong if

it was intended to continue after 1997 (the Open Skies treaty itself

is of unlimited duration); inclusion of Hong Kong would otherwise

only be in respect of the period up to 1997. Even up to 1997

Chinese agreement would be necessary if observation aircraft needed to enter Chinese airspace. The Chinese are unlikely to agree in

either event. There are no arms control reasons to include Hong

Kong other than the general one of openness which is insufficient to

tip the balance given political sensitivities.

9.

We do not know to what extent the Soviet Union might wish to

retain the option of overflights of Hong Kong at the risk of picking a fight with the Chinese.

are to exclude Hong Kong I suggest

If we

we try to tell the Russians in advance what we intend to do: they

may be disinclined to argue as they will face their own problems

HDBADG

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