SECRET UK EYES A
alone would be sufficient to overwhelm Hong Kong.
3. The boundary between the New Territories and Shenzhen could be
penetrated easily. Chinese marine troops at Zhanjiang (12 hours
sailing time away) could also be deployed in support, with naval and
air assistance. The Chinese would readily be able to achieve
enormous numerical superiority against the Hong Kong garrison's four
regular infantry battalions (just over 3000 men) which have no heavy
armour.
Degree of Advance Warning
4.
It is likely that we would receive almost no warning of an
imminent Chinese attack. A characteristic of PLA operations is ? their emphasis on pre-planning. Their operations are also very
difficult to monitor because they make very little use of radio
traffic. In any case, they have so many troops in the vicinity of
Hong Kong that no large scale movements would be required before the
operation.
Military Response
5. An effective military defence against a full-scale Chinese
invasion is therefore unrealistic without enormous reinforcement of
the Hong Kong garrison. Indeed, the MOD does not have a contingency
plan to deal with such an eventuality. The garrison would doubtless
conduct a delaying action using the high ground to the North of
Kowloon but no specific plans exist for this. The worst-case
scenario envisaged in the CBF's Operational Instructions is an
outbreak of internal disorder, coupled with an external threat.
This is based on the assumption that if the garrison can respond
rapidly to outbreaks of internal disorder, the Chinese would not
intervene.
6.
Reinforcement plans do exist to support the garrison but
these are also based on countering an internal threat. The Gurkha
battalion from Brunei could not be deployed in less than 72 hours,
depending on the availability of air transport. Reinforcement of
the garrison while Chinese aggression was underway would not be
SECRET UK EYES A
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