TNAG-2016-FCO40-2871-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Japan-1990 — Page 181

SUMMARY NOTE OF ANGLO-JAPANESE SYMPOSIUM, AVIGNON, 6-8 JULY 1990

1. The following sets out in a summarised form the main points of

interest in the discussion.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

2. Mr Howell gave a wide-ranging and somewhat pessimistic

introduction.

The chances of Gorbachev's survival were 3 to 1

against; the grand strategy of synchronising the internal and external processes of German unification might not work out (the probable fudge would be to agree a procedure for settling the

external aspects). It was not clear that the Russians had a real policy on Germany. He drew the conclusion that whatever happened

Changes in strategy were needed but the integrated bedrock of the Alliance must remain.

NATO must not be unwound.

3.

Other points in the discussion were:

Gorbachev was mad to talk about changing the Soviet economy in two years and the West was mad to talk about giving aid. Business could still be done if one off opportunities that did

not involve big investment could be found. But the political

and economic vacuum in the Soviet Union made it a high risk

business. (Gormley)

The main Japanese contribution to Eastern Europe would be via

business. But the Japanese Government also wished to be

involved, and not just from commercial motives. Warm thanks for

the UK initiative to bring the Japanese into CSCE Basket 2 via

OECD. But they were also looking for other links. (Fujii)

So far the Japanese Government had always compared the rapid

change in Europe to the lack of movement in the Far East.

But

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