SUMMARY NOTE OF ANGLO-JAPANESE SYMPOSIUM, AVIGNON, 6-8 JULY 1990
1. The following sets out in a summarised form the main points of
interest in the discussion.
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
2. Mr Howell gave a wide-ranging and somewhat pessimistic
introduction.
The chances of Gorbachev's survival were 3 to 1
against; the grand strategy of synchronising the internal and external processes of German unification might not work out (the probable fudge would be to agree a procedure for settling the
external aspects). It was not clear that the Russians had a real policy on Germany. He drew the conclusion that whatever happened
Changes in strategy were needed but the integrated bedrock of the Alliance must remain.
NATO must not be unwound.
3.
Other points in the discussion were:
Gorbachev was mad to talk about changing the Soviet economy in two years and the West was mad to talk about giving aid. Business could still be done if one off opportunities that did
not involve big investment could be found. But the political
and economic vacuum in the Soviet Union made it a high risk
business. (Gormley)
The main Japanese contribution to Eastern Europe would be via
business. But the Japanese Government also wished to be
involved, and not just from commercial motives. Warm thanks for
the UK initiative to bring the Japanese into CSCE Basket 2 via
OECD. But they were also looking for other links. (Fujii)
So far the Japanese Government had always compared the rapid
change in Europe to the lack of movement in the Far East.
But
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