TNAG-1939-FCO40-2765-Future-of-Hong-Kong-defence-and-public-order-1989 — Page 37

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UK EYES A

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reasons for holding such an exercise would need to be

carefully explained to the HKG and to the Chinese to avoid misunderstandings arising about its purpose. In particular, it would be essential to avoid creating the impression that the UK anticipates trouble before the final handover and

does not believe that the Hong Kong authorities have the

capability to preserve internal security and stability in the Territory. In addition, since the potential problems described in paragraph 12 could become more starkly apparent by 1992, presentation of the exercise to the Hong Kong

public could require delicate handling. For these reasons, it is proposed that, subject to the COS endorsing the

concept of a reinforcement exercise, the timing of the

exercise should be determined in close consultation with the

HKG.

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

41.

Sufficient supporting CIS facilities commensurate with operations will be required in Hong Kong throughout the period of withdrawal. Their ultimate removal or abandonment will need further study as part of the major review discussed in the following paragraph.

MAJOR REVIEW

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TIMESCALE

42. A major wide-ranging review of CDS 7/87 is currently scheduled to take place in 1992. This timescale was originally selected because it falls 5 years before the final withdrawal; it was recognised that 1991 would see the

formulation of crucial decisions relating to commercial re-investment in Hong Kong with implications for the

security and stability of the Territory. Under current

arrangements the next biennial review of CDS 7/87 will be

completed in February 1991, with the major review requested by the HKG being conducted by an unspecified date the

COS53.4-15

26 LOCSEN

UK EYES A

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