SECRET
UK EYES A
LOCSEN
reasons for holding such an exercise would need to be
carefully explained to the HKG and to the Chinese to avoid misunderstandings arising about its purpose. In particular, it would be essential to avoid creating the impression that the UK anticipates trouble before the final handover and
does not believe that the Hong Kong authorities have the
capability to preserve internal security and stability in the Territory. In addition, since the potential problems described in paragraph 12 could become more starkly apparent by 1992, presentation of the exercise to the Hong Kong
public could require delicate handling. For these reasons, it is proposed that, subject to the COS endorsing the
concept of a reinforcement exercise, the timing of the
exercise should be determined in close consultation with the
HKG.
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING
41.
Sufficient supporting CIS facilities commensurate with operations will be required in Hong Kong throughout the period of withdrawal. Their ultimate removal or abandonment will need further study as part of the major review discussed in the following paragraph.
MAJOR REVIEW
-
TIMESCALE
42. A major wide-ranging review of CDS 7/87 is currently scheduled to take place in 1992. This timescale was originally selected because it falls 5 years before the final withdrawal; it was recognised that 1991 would see the
formulation of crucial decisions relating to commercial re-investment in Hong Kong with implications for the
security and stability of the Territory. Under current
arrangements the next biennial review of CDS 7/87 will be
completed in February 1991, with the major review requested by the HKG being conducted by an unspecified date the
COS53.4-15
26 LOCSEN
UK EYES A
SECRET