14 June 1989]
[Mr Shore Contd
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, QC, MP, MR R McLaren and MR A PAUL
into our thinking about just how far we can press progress towards democracy before 1997. If, of course, we simply say “Well, if we press ahead too far then the Chinese may refuse to accept it after 1997" and bring an end to that continuity to which you have referred, then, of course, we would do nothing to press the Chinese beyond what we ourselves believe to be their own limit. Neverthe- less, we have the responsibility of Hong Kong until 1997. If there is going to be mirror-imaging (partic- ularly after the events of the last few weeks) would it not be far better if we provided the image and the Chinese did the mirroring?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) That is a splendidly robust way of putting it, and I can understand why you want to put it like that. But if we provided the image and the Chinese thrust the mirror, where would that leave us? It is not a matter of timidity, it is a matter of judgment and advocacy, and I would invite you to believe that the whole process of inserting into this structure the concept of demo- cratic elections has been a struggle of wills and aspirations from the outset. I told you when I first gave evidence that the concept of election and the relevant clause in the Joint Declaration got in only at the eleventh hour—literally two or three days before we came to a conclusion. The advances we have made in Chinese comprehension thus far have been part of the results of that process. The question today is “Where do we go?” I am sure it is wrong to conclude, on the one hand, “The game is up; China is committed to an indefinitely pro- gressive prospect of tyranny in the years ahead”. That may be so but one should not conclude that- it would be a very risky conclusion. I think that the rational argument that I would like to advance in these circumstances to people of the kind I have been dealing with till a few weeks ago is “Look, it has been common ground that democracy and elections are an important and increasingly perceived component of stability in Hong Kong". As a result of what has happened in Peking in recent weeks it is surely not surprising that they have grown in importance, and it is much more important to seek more assurance in that direction. Whereas the old-fashioned Chinese leadership might, at one time, have regarded more ambition in this direction in Hong Kong as unintelligible, if not provocative, you must now surely see that further progress in that direction makes sense to consolidate the developments about which we are concerned. That does not mean one would neces- sarily go to the point of saying: "And what is more, just to show we are right, we are going to exercise our authority which we have till 1997 to the limit”, if there is a prospect—and one is dealing with judgments all the time-of achieving more substantial progress of a more durable kind. So it is not timidity, it is effective, constructive manage- ment of the materials in one's hands. I fully see why you mention it, but it is important to reflect that the judgment in favour of 50 per cent by 1997 comes from OMELCO who are not (I think you will share my judgment) primarily concerned with preserving their own representative. They are people with a tremendously high sense of duty
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looking at what is best for Hong Kong, and their judgment may now shift. That is why it is import- ant to take account of what they are not thinking. Their judgment, my judgment, your judgment today may be different from that which may have been formulated three or four months out. The thrust and way you are trying to take us is right, I am sorry if I responded with in due vigour on your splendid image.
Mr Rowlands
977. I would like to pursue that point, Secretary of State. I think you do sound rather timid and it constrasts rather sharply to that very bold state- ment you made in the House when you talked about the bulwark of their own freedom (that is Hong Kong's freedom) and an example to the Chinese people. For example, do you think, in the light of events, that a mere 10 directly elected representatives out or 55 in the 1991 elections represents a potential bulwark, or a good example to the Chinese people?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) You asked the Governor about that as well. As I understand it, the judgment the Governor offered you on Monday about that is that there is little weight within Hong Kong behind the case for changing what is to happen in 1991. That is the reality. On the other hand, there is a substantial change in opinion on what could happen by 1997. That is obviously a matter for consideration.
978. You are implying, as indeed the Governor did, that throughout there should be this invisible hand on the whole show; that where responsibility lies (and we do have responsibility until 1997) nevertheless, all the time there is going to be this invisible Chinese hand saying “You must not go too far too quickly between now and 1997 because the Chinese might tear it all up in 1997”. I think the burden of the evidence we received when in Peking-and we must assume it still stands—is that the Chinese said it is up to Hong Kong to decide how far it wants to go and at what pace. Would you then say that even OMELCO's pro- posal of 50 per cent by 1997 should be the subject of this cautionary hand?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) All those factors were taken into account when OMELCO unanimously, representing all the different standings in the councils in Hong Kong, came to this conclusion of 50 per cent by 1997 on the basis of the fact that they focus they were made on 24 May. If OMELCO unanimously came to that conclusion then it has taken account of the whole range of factors. I have to come back to this question: suppose that none of the events of the last month had happened and that the Hong Kong Government had said next year, or whatever, "We have decided to accelerate dramatically the pace of movement towards direct elections; we are going to have 100 per cent direct elections next week". Suppose the immediate consequence of that had been the most fierce denunciation of it from the Peking Government, what would the effect of that have been on the prospects of stability
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