358
14 June 1989]
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HowE, QC, MP, MR R MCLAREN and MR A Paul
Mr Bowen Wells
972. In your replies in the House of Commons on 6 June you seemed to dismiss suggestions that the United Nations might have any role to play. Do you see no way in which its considerable weight and influence might be used to support the guarantees and undertakings of the Joint Declar- ation more than simply by having registered the Joint Declaration at the United Nations, particu- larly in view of Britain's membership of the Secur- ity Council along with that of the Chinese People's Republic?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) One of the reasons for securing the Joint Declaration and for it being lodged by both governments at the UN as an inter- nationally binding agreement was to give it as much authority as one could from its international status. It was for that reason that I drew attention to it, and one of the factors I had in mind as I drew attention to it, when I was presiding on the Security Council, was to give it the most widely publicised international legitimacy. I think that is something we shall continue to emphasise. The only point on which I think one has to hesitate is whether there is any actual effective way of mobilising the United Nations as such to add to that everything one can possibly to do to enhance and underline the importance of the international commitment by reminding the Chinese Government of our joint membership of the Security Council and our joint interests and duties. We shall certainly mobilise on all that. I do not think there is any way in which one could actually wheel any given UN agency into effect in that fashion.
973. But the Security Council under the leader- ship of Britain, in particular, has been very effective in recent international areas of tension, such as the Iran/Iraq War and, of course, Afghanistan and Namibia. Would you not think that a breach of the Joint Declaration registered with the United Nations would not bring in, and you would not seek to bring in, the Security Council in an attempt to made certain that the Chinese respected and lived up to the letter and spirit of the Joint Declar- ation?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I am not excluding it as a matter of principle, but if one looks at the reality, that China is itself one of the prime members of the council in any such a discussion, I think one has got to ask oneself quite seriously whether that is likely to the most effective way of mobilising respect from China. One would want to achieve every other manifestation of their obligation. Per- haps I could put it more realistically: how much good do you think it would do to the cause we have in mind if we ended up with a debate on the Security Council with the Chinese Government vetoing its own obligations under the agreement at that stage?
974. Would it not at least make it quite clear to the international community exactly what China was doing?
[Continued
is not the problem. The problem is to try and secure the right course for China. One has to look at it realistically. It would be easy enough to show if the agreement had been wholly disregarded but by then it is too late. What one is seeking to do is to remobilise the sense of international obligation which the Chinese authorities have indeed shown Can circumspectly (?) in recent years. I think, without being illusionary at all, the best way is to pus-ea the positive side what we are expecting from them. If we reach the other end of the debate it is too late.
Chairman: I think, Sir Geoffrey, we will want to come back to the question of mobilising inter- national support on particular aspects of the prob- lem in a moment. Could we just move on now to the internal Hong Kong scene and the question of the pace of political development, on which you made some comments both this morning and else- where?
Mr Shore
975. I am sure that people in Hong Kong are very much exercised about the defences against the encroachment of Chinese influence and power in their own domestic politics and in Government in Hong Kong after 1997. I noticed in your exchange in the House on 6 June you said, in reply to Dr Jeremy Bray: "One of the most important new factors in the scene... (is) the extent to which the shape of representative institutions in Hong Kong can serve not only as a bulwark for their own
If representative insitutions can serve as a bulwark, freedom but as an example to the Chinese people".
should we not now make every effort to introduce full democracy in Hong Kong before 1997?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) This is a topic, of course, which you discussed with the Governor at some length on Monday. Clearly Hong Kong itself will be wanting to re-examine the plans that were in prospect. As you know, I think it was on 24 May, OMELCO called for an acceleration of the pace that was then in prospect but stopped short of calling for 100 per cent democratisation, and looked forward to 50 per cent directly elected by 1997 and the rest by 2003. Clearly we shall be interested in hearing how far and in what direction Hong Kong has gone since then. I think the one feature one must remind oneself about all the time is the desirability of continuity in this field. I know that one or other of you-Mr Rowlands I think— was being slightly critical of the Governor's refer- ence to continuity. I understand that, but if our purpose is to put in place democratic structures that are likely to endure and to advance and con- solidate the process of democratic change there, one has to take account of what is likely to happen in 1997. Again, this is a question that is a foolish, vacuum-based question#It was not a foolish, vacuum-based question three months back-but one still has to look forward to the possibility of securing institutions which will then go through 1997 without being immediately unstitched.
976. The only trouble with that approach is that,
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) Yes, but, with respect, that of course, a certain timidity appears to have crept
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