360
14 June 1989]
[Mr Rowlands Contd]
and prosperity of Hong Kong.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
RT HON SIR Geoffrey HowE, QC, MP, MR R McLaren and MR A PAUL
979. Are you not trying to frighten the Hong Kong people into caution all the time? Is that not what is behind it?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) No. What interest have I got to frighten anybody into anything? It is my judgment and my responsibility on the advice we receive as to what the right step to take is and what is the right pace at which to take it. I invite you once again to look at conclusions offered by OMELCO itself. They have not frightened themselves into a conclusion for 1997, they have offered a considered judgment in light of the facts as they stood. One has to respect that, one also has to respect the fact that that was three weeks ago and things have changed.
Mr Welsh
980. Can I just put this point? Do you not have to consider the quality of advice you are receiving in this respect? First of all, the Governors of Hong Kong have themselves been very reluctant indeed to promote the advancement of democracy in Hong Kong over the years. We had evidence from Lord Maclehose on it when he was Governor and why he did not promote it. I think you ought to consider also, Foreign Secretary, that OMELCO is not a representative body, it is in fact the Governor's body; he appointed it, now I under- stand on what basis he appointed it, he was trying to get as broad a representation as possible. But it is not and cannot be represented as being, as you have just I think accepted in the way you have spoken to us, a true representation of the opinions of the people of Hong Kong. I think you really ought to look behind that and consider the quality of the advice you are receiving in this respect, then consider what alternatives Hong Kong people have to democracy if they are to have some bulwark against the kind of pressure that Peking will bring to bear on a body which is not directly elected.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I fully understand that. I made the point two or three questions ago that OMELCO is not itself directly elected. One has to discount the fact that it might be seeking to pre- serve its own tenure. I do not think anyone is suggesting that. They are behaving conscientiously to the utmost limit in the type of judgments that have to be arrived at. But OMELCO itself contains a wide variation of opinion on this very topic, notwithstanding that it was the unanimous con- clusion of OMELCO to reach the conclusion we were all talking about earlier on.
981. The best they could get-like we have got to put up with.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) That may be. The best you can get is not necessarily the worst. “Best" can be >the enemy of "best you can get❞.
Mr Taylor
982. Foreign Secretary, in essence you replied to some of these substantive points. I think what some of us on the Committee were concerned
[Continued
about briefly is that too fast a pace for democracy could cause instability in Kong Kong and I think some of us now conclude that we have to give that risk to the people of Hong Kong in order that they can have as much influence on their own lives through 1997, and that is the opportunity in a sense for the British Government to give a completely green light to the people of Hong Kong to make a decision as to how fast they go. Finally, in a sense, what we must not do as Britain is to leave any element of doubt about this 1997, because we surely cannot expect the people of Hong Kong to ask the Government of Beijing for more democ- racy because we have seen the reaction of the Government of Beijing to its own people in Tiananmen Square when they asked for democ- racy. So nothing must be left in doubt when the British Government hands over in 1997.
x !!
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) Of course, what has happened in the last few weeks alters the focus in which all questions have to be answered. That is why I qualified the significance of the major conclusion of OMELCO, and you are right to say that the question which people need to be focusing on is what is the objective, what is the target, in 1997, because it is that in respect of which we do Hat see continuity. We have already, as you know, secured agreement to continuity in the personnel, it is accepted that people who are elected and in post by that time should remain in place—those in place by that time should remain there. That means you have to decide what is to be the pattern of the elections in 1995. That is when the last elections will be held before 1997. That means you may need to decide whether there is any scope for the elections in 1991. So all those matters are (Che matters for further consideration. What is the outturn? What is the objective? What does that imply to the 1995 elections? What does that imply
for the 1991 elections? It is on these things that we need to come as close as we can to what the Governor was describing as the Hong Kong view. I fully understand the case that can be made for moving a hundred per cent of the way, but it would be foolish to disregard the necessity of trying to dering the Hong Kong view. Mr Bowen Wells, I understand your anxiety about quality judgments. Vy high quality can be attached to the views of members of OMELCO and others who advise us. One of the most difficult questions we have to consider is our objective—it is not to go through a procedure for the sake of it but for the sake of what we can achieve as a result of it. If by so doing we consolidate democracy in Hong Kong and offer a durable example to the people of China, that would be the ideal.
Mr Shore
983. I am struck by the importance that you have attached to the OMELCO decision or recommendation of 24 May. I think it is, apart from being obviously an imperfectly representa- tive body, a body that can claim considerable credi- bility in terms of Hong Kong opinion. But, of course, they made their proposal on 24 May, as
chat.
122.
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