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protecting their flank in Congress from criticism that they have been insufficiently tough on the Khmer Rouge has become their top priority. (In our Embassy's assessment, their second objective is to keep up the momentum of contacts with the Chinese and Russians and the third to keep in step with ASEAN, particularly Thailand.)
7.
Within ASEAN, certainly as reflected in their draft Resolution (not yet cleared in capitals) but more widely, a certain disposition to move towards Vietnam and away from the Khmer Rouge is also discernible. The new Chatichai Government seems more interested in Indo-China's commercial potential than its predecessors. Mr Thach is adept at playing on divisions within ASEAN, as he showed at the JIM. ASEAN may seek to reflect these developments in the UNGA Resolution by including a reference to "international supervision" (possibly international control and supervision, echoing the title of the 1954 ICC) in exchange for a reference to "the non-return of universally condemned policies and practices of the past" and an international conference "under the auspices of the Secretary General" (ie a looser connection between the conference and the UN).
8.
On the boat people problem, we had a first inconclusive bilateral round in Hanoi on 3/4 August. The Malaysians had their first round on 26-29 August when they expressed their preparedness "to consider extending some kind of resistance within their limited means". Vietnam agreed to participate in an international conference on Indo-China refugees next year and the preparatory conference later this year.
Cambodia and the United Nations Security Council
9.
Hitherto, we have argued that the onus is on the regional parties (ie the four Khmer factions, Vietnam and the ASEAN countries) to reach some kind of consensus on the way forward and that wider international action, such as a conference, was for a later stage. It may be that this approach needs to be re-examined, particularly in the light of paragraph 4 (c), (d) and (e) above. Over Iran/Iraq, the UNSC did not simply wait until the two combatants decided to stop fighting. The UNSC provided the forum in which the five powers were able to discuss the kind of outcome to the conflict which they could accept and, in so doing, brought international pressure to bear on the parties to stop fighting and talk. It may be that the efforts of the regional players to reach a consensus could be usefully complemented and assisted by an understanding among the five Permanent Members on the way forward.
CA2AJC
CONFIDENTIAL
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