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10. In relation to Cambodia, the Sino-Soviet relationship is crucial. If they can broadly agree what kind of outcome in Cambodia they are prepared to accept, the UNSC could be in business. Unfortunately, Cambodia is more complicated than Iran/Iraq where the first objective was to achieve a ceasefire. The "proxies" of UNSC members were not protagánists, as they are in Cambodia. Nevertheless, if we could establish, in consultation with the US and France, a broadly agreed range of desirable options, UNSC involvement could be beneficial. The downside lies in the potential resource implications. If, for example, it turns out that there is no safe political mechanism for ensuring that the Khmer Rouge does not disrupt the country in the wake of Vietnamese withdrawal, what would our attitude be to a
Would we requirement for substantial peace keeping forces? be prepared to participate in a requirement which was clearly defined as a result of our own diplomatic efforts? That said, it seems inevitable that we shall face this question at some stage, whether or not the issue is precipitated in the UNSC. And the Japanese have offered to finance a peace keeping force.
11.
There are other potential advantages in our promoting discussion of Cambodia in the UNSC. The present political conjuncture gives us something of a leading position among the five. HM Embassy Washington's judgement is that the Reagan administration is not looking on Cambodia as an issue where they can achieve a breakthrough in the months before the Presidential election and they are not yet taking full
But (Nor should we). Vietnamese withdrawal for granted. both Bush and Dukakis are likely to be more favourable to UN involvement in such issues than Reagan. Our historical position as co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference gives us a little added authority. UNSC involvement would help to put the irrelevant and potentially damaging interest of the NAM into baulk and cramp Vietnam's diplomatic efforts to garner support in that particular galère. Finally, it would assist us in answering growing public, NGO and Parliamentary pressure for greater activism in preventing the return of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.
Dimm
DH Colvin
CA 2AJC
CONFIDENTIAL
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