TNAG-1657-FCO40-2305-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1987 — Page 153

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CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11C

the transit of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices in any form or visits to ports and airfields

inside the Nuclear Free Zone by foreign military vessels

and aircraft carrying nuclear explosive devices. The

declaration added that in the event of actions taken by a

State Party(ies) to the Treaty in contravention of their

basic obligations under the Treaty concerning the

nuclear free status of the zone, or the penetration by

one or more States Parties to the Treaty of an act of

agression with the support of or together with a

nuclear weapon state, involving the use by that state

of the territory, airspace,

territorial sea or

n

archipelagic waters of those countries for visits by

military vessels and aircraaft carrying nuclear weapons

as for the transit of nuclear weapons or any other

actions by the Parties to the Treaty which are

incompatible with their nuclear free status, the Soviet

Union will be entitled to regard itself as free from the

obligations undertaken by it under Protocol II of the

Treaty. In response to the Russian declaration,

Australia has made it clear that the Treaty "in no

practical way" impedes Australia's ability to cooperate

with its Allies or to contribute to the maintenance of

1(

be possible stable nuclear deterrence. This might open-a-way to

reach satisfactory arrangements for nuclear ship visits

etc with the States concerned and for an acceptable

definition of "stationing" in respect of Pitcairn.

However the implication of the Treaty for nuclear

transit/ships/aircraft visits are unclear, as is the

legal status and significance of the Soviet declaration.

CONFIDENTIAL