TNAG-1657-FCO40-2305-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1987 — Page 154

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DSR 11C

These points need clarification by the States Parties.

(b) Protocol II of both the SPNFZT and Tlatelolco both

contain provisions for negative security assurances,

effect of which is to prohibit the first use or threaten

use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances.

to

As we

made clear in February 1986 the representatives of

the South Pacific Forum States who chose to ignore

the point this goes further than the general

undertaking which we gave in 1978 to all non-nuclear

weapon States parties to the NPT or other internationally

binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear

explosive devices, viz that we would not use or threaten

use of nuclear weapons against them "expect in the case

of an attack on the UK, its dependent territories, its

armed forces or its allies by such a State in association

or alliance with a nuclear weapon State". This

undertaking is thus already available to regional States

who are NPT members and/or ratify the SPNFZT. It would

need a change of policy by Ministers, which we would be

most unwilling to recommend in view of its implications

for our policy on NOFUN in Europe, to ratify Protocol II

as it stands. Our legal right to make a reservation

under Protocol to ensure that the NSA we gave was

consistent with our existing policy is unclear.

the Soviet Union appears to have made such a reservation

and the NSA we gave to the Contracting Parties to

Tlatelolco was also qualified.

However

(c) The definition of "territory" in the Treaty includes

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