TNAG-1657-FCO40-2305-Daya-Bay-nuclear-power-station-project-safety-concerns-in-Ho-1987 — Page 152

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

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ANNEX 4

NOTE ON LEGAL AND DEFINITIVNAL SOUTH MARFIL NUMEAK FREE

SPNFZT AND

201

THE

SOVIET DECLARAT N

Aruising From THE TREATY AND PROTOCOLS,

1. The UK has a number of specific concerns arising from

the wording of the Treaty and the Protocols:-

Enclosures flag(s)

It

(a) The definition in Article I of the Treaty of

'stationing" nuclear explosive devices goes wider than

the equivalent provision in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

could affect us in two ways; in relation to the

prohibition on "stationing" of nuclear explosive devices.

under Protocol I and the rights of nuclear weapon transit

and/at/ships/aircrafts visits in the rest of the SPNFZT

zone.

Article V of the Treaty provides that each Party

is free to decide policy on foreign ships/aircraft visits

and navigation in its territorial waters. However,

hotwithstanding Article V, the Soviet Union made a

declaration on signature of the Protocols II and III to

reaffirm its position that it would be contrary to the

purposes of the Treaty and incompatible with the nuclear

free status of the zone (for States Parties) to permit

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