TNAG-1638-FCO40-2282-Future-of-Hong-Kong-withdrawal-of-the-British-garrison-1987 — Page 90

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

LOCSEN

SECRET UK EYES A

terms the retention of the full 1987-level 4 battalion

garrison until 1997. This would allow for any shortfalls

in Police expansion plans and provide a large, effective

military presence able to deal with any level of disorder. It would also serve to underpin a newly constituted Police force and thus provide a large insurance policy of

considerable deterrence value. It would demonstrate HMG'S

commitment to Hong Kong and would almost certainly meet with the approval of the PRCG. On the other hand, such a large and long term presence would seriously weaken the credibility of the Police and could encourage the PRCG to fill the vacuum with an equally large PLA presence after

the garrison's final withdrawal. It would require double -funding with the parallel expansion of the Police at a time of possibly greater financial stringency. This

option is not supported by the HKG, FCO or MOD. It is

not therefore considered further although there is always the possibility that this may be the option which the PRCG would seek to persuade us to adopt.

-

b. The 'Zero' Option. The rationale for an early total

withdrawal is that, once an expanded Police force has taken

over all remaining military tasks, there should be no military

role for a garrison; therefore it should be withdrawn. Such

an early withdrawal would serve to demonstrate confidence in

the Police, avoid any double-funding by the HKG, and

provide less justification for a large PLA presence post-1997. These are all factors which attract some sympathy from the HKG. However, in view of the uncertainties that must always

exist when looking so far ahead, this option involves higher political risks than Option a. It could be (mis) interpreted

as premature abrogation of the UK's commitment towards

Hong Kong, and the precipitate withdrawal of the military force could in itself contribute to instability. Of

greater concern is the prospect that a serious breakdown of law and order would require major reinforcement from

the UK. The unique circumstances of Hong Kong make the

reinforcement option militarily untenable. The effectiveness

COS S/172(1)

17

UK EYES A

SECRET

LOCSEN

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