LOCSEN
SECRET UK EYES A
terms the retention of the full 1987-level 4 battalion
garrison until 1997. This would allow for any shortfalls
in Police expansion plans and provide a large, effective
military presence able to deal with any level of disorder. It would also serve to underpin a newly constituted Police force and thus provide a large insurance policy of
considerable deterrence value. It would demonstrate HMG'S
commitment to Hong Kong and would almost certainly meet with the approval of the PRCG. On the other hand, such a large and long term presence would seriously weaken the credibility of the Police and could encourage the PRCG to fill the vacuum with an equally large PLA presence after
the garrison's final withdrawal. It would require double -funding with the parallel expansion of the Police at a time of possibly greater financial stringency. This
option is not supported by the HKG, FCO or MOD. It is
not therefore considered further although there is always the possibility that this may be the option which the PRCG would seek to persuade us to adopt.
-
b. The 'Zero' Option. The rationale for an early total
withdrawal is that, once an expanded Police force has taken
over all remaining military tasks, there should be no military
role for a garrison; therefore it should be withdrawn. Such
an early withdrawal would serve to demonstrate confidence in
the Police, avoid any double-funding by the HKG, and
provide less justification for a large PLA presence post-1997. These are all factors which attract some sympathy from the HKG. However, in view of the uncertainties that must always
exist when looking so far ahead, this option involves higher political risks than Option a. It could be (mis) interpreted
as premature abrogation of the UK's commitment towards
Hong Kong, and the precipitate withdrawal of the military force could in itself contribute to instability. Of
greater concern is the prospect that a serious breakdown of law and order would require major reinforcement from
the UK. The unique circumstances of Hong Kong make the
reinforcement option militarily untenable. The effectiveness
COS S/172(1)
17
UK EYES A
SECRET
LOCSEN
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