TNAG-1444-FCO40-1928-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 35

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could be destabilising factor. Hong Kong's would-be

politicians are inexperienced.

6.

Likely outcome of 1987 review on this issue one of two

scenarios:

7.

(i) consensus in favour of introducing small directly

elected element in 1988 elections. At present less probable outcome. Would have to explain to Chinese strong political need to respond, damage to authority in Hong Kong and Westminster if we

seemed to duck issue. A difficult task. But

possible to envisage devices (eg separate but

parallel statements on British and Chinese sides)

which might permit us to introduce direct elections

without loss of Chinese face.

(ii) no clear consensus. Most likely outcome. Depending on division of opinion, options would then be (a) to go ahead with a directly-elected element and tackle Chinese as in (i), but on weaker ground; (b) to

postpone decision on direct elections. With latter

option, problem of compatibility with Chinese

intentions reduced. But we should face criticism

from some in Hong Kong and Parliament, and Hong Kong confidence could be damaged.

In meantime, vital to intensify dialogue with Chinese over all issues connected with structure of government and Basic Law. My exchanges with Wu Xueqian on these issues have been constructive and friendly. The greater our mutual trust, the better the prospects of managing problems in this

sensitive area.

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