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SECRET
14. IF NEVERTHELESS IT WAS TECESSARY TO RETAIN SOME BACK-UP TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATION IN THE LATER YEARS, THIS COULD DE PROVIDED BY A REDUCED BRITISH GARRISON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH BRITISH FORCES COULD BE USED IN THE MID-1990'S OTHER THAN IN SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES. IF THERE WERE RIOTS AND TH
HONG KONG ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO ACT EFFECTIVELY TO RESTORE ORDER, IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR HMG TO USE BRITISH FORCES TO DO SO, WHETHER AT THE BEHEST OF PEKING OR NOT. THE CHOICE FOR HMG IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE EITHER TO WITHDRAW ALL EXCEPT A TOKEN BRITISH FORCE TO AVOID THE DILEMA OVER INTERVENTION: OR TO LEAVE A SMALL GARRISON UNDER A COMMANDER BRITISH FORCES, WHICH WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE NO MORE THAN A SUPPORT ROLE IN INTERNAL SECURITY. THE PROXIMITY OF CHINESE FORCES AND THE IMMINENCE OF THE HANDOVER WOULD BE THE MAIN DETERRENT TO DISORDER IN HONG KONG.
ACTION IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT
15. SIMILARLY, IT WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD BE THE MAIN DETERRENT TO THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ACTING IN BREACH OF AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE. THE RETENTION OF A GOVERNOR DIRECTLY APPOINTED FROM LONDON, WHETHER COMBINED WITH AN ELECTED CHIEF MINISTER OR NOT, WOULD NOT PREVENT SUCH A SITUATION. IF IT WERE TO ARISE, FOR THE GOVERNOR TO ACT AGAINST THE ADVICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND IN OPPOSITION TO THE WISHES OF THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF BOTH COUNCILS, OR TO DISMISS AN ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WOULD CREATE NO LESS OF A CRISIS THAN FOR HMG TO ABROGATE THE CONSTITUTION, DISMISS AN ELECTED GOVERNOR, AND IMPOSE DIRECT RULE. THESE RISKS ARE AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A REPRESENTATIVE AND AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990S, WHETHER THE GOVERNOR IS ELECTED OR NOT.
THE CHINESE REACTION
16. THE CHINESE WILL NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF A GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM IN HONG KONG. IN PARTICULAR, THEY MAY REACT BADLY TO A PRO- POSAL THAT AN ELECTED GOVERNOR SHOULD BE INTRODUCED BEFORE 1997, ACCUSING HMG OF SEEKING TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY IN HONG KONG. JUDGING BY WHAT THEY HAVE SAID, THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF OBTAINING THEIR SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO THE PROGRAMME OF INTRODUCING REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG WITH ELECTED COUNCILS AND AN ELECTED GOVERNOR. IF, THEREFORE, HMG WERE SPECIFIC- ALLY TO SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT THEY WOULD DECLINE TO GIVE IT AND WE SHOULD BE FACED WITH ACCEPTING THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE A VETO: OR GOING AHEAD IN THE FACE OF THEIR EXPRESSED DISAPPROVAL.
17. MIGHT BE TEMPTING TO SEEK THEIR APPROVAL IN EXCHANGE FOR ALLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT IN HONG KONG OF THE JOINT BRITISH/CHINESE GROUP WHICH THEY HAVE PROPOSED. THAT GROUP IS, HOWEVER, DESIGNED TO INTRODUCE A SUPERVISORY BODY TO MONITOR THE ACTIONS OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT BETWEEN NOW AND 1997. IT WOULD, IN CONSEQUENCE, ITSELF FRUSTRATE THE INTRODUCTION OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, WELL AS PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE FOCUS OF AUTHORITY IN HONG KONG OVER THE NEXT DECADE. SECRET -4 -
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