POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE.
SECRET
9. ON THE QUESTION OF HMG'S POWERS IT IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POST OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE, TO BE ELECTED BY THE COUNCILS WHO WOULD CHAIR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, WHILE MAINTAINING A GOVERNOR TO EXERCISE HMG'S RESIDUAL POWERS. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE VERY DISRUPTIVE OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND INTRODUCE A FURTHER ELEMENT OF DISCONTINUITY. IT WOULD AGIVE THE CHINESE A HEAVEN SENT OPPORTUNITY TO INSTAL SOMEONE FROM PEKING AS SUCCESSOR TO THE LAST BRITISH GOVERNOP. SUCH A PERSON WOULD PROBABLY NOT ONLY RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PUT IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN ALL OTHER SPHERES
OF GOVERNMENT.
10. GIVEN THAT EXCO AND LEGCO WOULD HAVE A MANDATE FROM THE ELECTORS, AND THAT THE SYSTEM WOULD ONLY COME INTO FORCE JUST BEFORE THE HANDOVER TO CHINA, THE GOVERNOR WOULD BE IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION IF HE SOUGHT TO OVER-RULE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND EXCO. IT IS OUR AIM THAT THE LOYALTY OF THE POLICE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE AT THAT POINT SHOULD BE TO THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG.
IT WOULD CREATE SERIOUS CONFUSION AND POSSIBLY ANARCHY IF A BRITISH GOVERNOR WERE TO SEEK TO USE THE CIVIL SERVICE AND POLICE TO FRUSTRATE AN ELECTED EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.
11. IT IS NOT ARGUED THAT TO ESTABLISH AN ELECTED GOVERNOR WOULD BE A RISK FREE OPTION FOR HMG. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD BE A VERY UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION. BUT THE RISKS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE POWER IN THE HANDS OF HMG EXERCISABLE THROUGH A RESIDENT GOVERNOR RIGHT UP TO 1997 ARE EVEN GREATER. WE ARE IN ANY CASE ASKING THE CHINESE TO ACCEPT THE ELECTED GOVERNOR FOR 50 YEARS: AND HMG WILL DEMONSTRATE LITTLE FAITH IN THE SYSTEM IF THEY THEMSELVES ARE NOT PREPARED TO TRY TO INTRODUCE IT.
RESIDUAL POWERS.
12. AS REGARDS FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL DEFENCE HMG'S PROBLEMS WOULD NOT BE GREAT. IF THE ELECTED GOVERNOR SOUGHT TO CONDUCT FOREIGN AFFAIRS OUTSIDE THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATION THIS COULD EASILY BE FRUSTRATED BY HMG INTERVENING WITH THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONCERNED: AND BY THE 1990'S HMG WILL BE IN NO POSITION TO DEFEND HONG KONG AGAINST ANY FORESEEABLE
EXTERNAL THREAT.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
13. HMG HAVE ARGUED STRONGLY WITH THE CHINESE THAT INTERNAL SECURITY SHOULD BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATION. THIS IS THE MAIN PLANK IN OUR ARGUMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES WILL NOT NEED TO BE STATIONED IN HONG KONG. FOR HMG TO SEEK TO RESERVE TO ITSELF THE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY WOULD BE TO
DESTROY ITS OWN ARGUMENT. SECRET-3
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